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Abstract: This study aims to examine the effect of stakeholder expectations and 
environmental performance on environmental disclosures. Stakeholder expectation is 
characterized by the influence exerted by internal, external and intermediary 
stakeholder on environmental disclosure. Environmental performance is proxied by 
group-level direct and indirect energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. 
Meanwhile, the environmental disclosure is proxied by a disclosure score of 
environmental information available on firms' environmental or sustainability reports. 
The sample comprised of European firms extracted from the FTSEurofirst 300 Index 
Constituents during 2007-2011. The results suggest that neither stakeholder 
expectations nor environmental performance is related to or associated with 
environmental disclosure. 
 
Keywords: Environmental Disclosure, Stakeholder Expectations, Environmental 
Performance, Environmental Accounting 
 
Intisari: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh ekspektasi pemangku 
kepentingan dan kinerja lingkungan pada pengungkapan lingkungan. Harapan 
pemangku kepentingan dicirikan oleh pengaruh yang diberikan oleh pemangku 
kepentingan internal, eksternal dan perantara pada pengungkapan lingkungan. 
Kinerja lingkungan diproksikan dengan konsumsi energi langsung dan tidak langsung 
tingkat grup dan emisi gas rumah kaca. Sementara itu, pengungkapan lingkungan 
diproksi dengan skor pengungkapan informasi lingkungan yang tersedia pada laporan 
lingkungan atau keberlanjutan perusahaan. Sampel terdiri dari perusahaan-
perusahaan Eropa yang diekstraksi dari FTSEurofirst 300 Index Constituents selama 
2007-2011. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa baik harapan pemangku kepentingan 
maupun kinerja lingkungan terkait atau terkait dengan pengungkapan lingkungan. 
 
Kata kunci: Pengungkapan Lingkungan, Harapan Pemangku Kepentingan, Kinerja 
Lingkungan, Akuntansi Lingkungan 
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1. Introduction 
Previous studies in environmental disclosure have discovered a variety of 
stakeholder groups or constituencies that may prompt a firm to expand disclosure of 
its environmental information (Cormier and Magnan, 2003; Elijido-Ten, 2007; Hong 
et al., 2012; Huang and Kung, 2010; Neu et al., 1998; Roberts, 1992). Neu et al. 
(1998) argued that environmental disclosure could be perceived as a firm's response to 
pressures exerted by various stakeholders or constituencies. When stakeholders exert 
more pressures, a firm will demonstrate more urge to satisfy and fulfill their demands 
by exhibiting more social and environmental responsibility. A simple way to show this 
responsibility is through communication, by publishing social and environmental 
disclosures. 
Aside from stakeholder demands and pressures, firms need to take into 
consideration other issues regarding the promotion of environmental activities and 
environmental performance (Huang and Kung, 2010). Previous studies on the 
relationship between environmental disclosure and environmental performance have 
produced mix results. Some studies (e.g., Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 
2008; Dawkins and Fraas, 2011; Dragomir, 2010; Hughes et al., 2001; and Li et al., 
1997) found a significant association between environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance. Other studies, however, found no relationship between 
firms' environmental performance and their environmental disclosure (Freedman and 
Jaggi, 1982; Freedman and Wasley, 1990; Ingram and Frazier, 1980; and Wiseman, 
1982). 
Given the little evidence on the relationship between stakeholder groups and 
environmental disclosure, the inconsistency between firms' environmental 
performance and their disclosures and the possible impact of stakeholders and 
environmental performance have on environmental disclosure, and this study aims to 
replicate the study performed by Huang and Kung (2010). Additionally, it extends the 
model employed by Huang and Kung as it adds environmental performance into the 
model and examines its relationship with environmental disclosure. It is worth noting 
that the reporting sample of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) 
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employed by Huang and Kung is seen unsatisfactory and the information is very 
fragmented (Huang and Kung, 2010). It may be driven by insufficient environmental 
awareness demonstrated by local firms along with the low demands from a 
stakeholder in general for environmental disclosure. Taken this view into 
consideration, this study thus employs a sample comprised of European firms 
extracted from FTSEurofirst 300 Index Constituents, the definitive benchmark of 
blue-chip European equities (Dragomir, 2010). Additionally, this study examines the 
sample in five periods (2007-2011) thus becomes the empirical contribution of this 
study, given the vast majority of mainstream studies are focused on US data 
(Dragomir, 2010).  
The purpose of this study is to examine whether stakeholder groups influence the 
disclosure of firms' environmental information and to analyze the association between 
firms' environmental performance and their environmental disclosures in a European 
context. With a total of 160 samples, we regress the disclosure score on stakeholder 
expectations and environmental performance after controlling for firm size and 
inclusion in sustainability index. The results show that neither stakeholder 
expectations nor environmental performance is related to or associated with 
environmental disclosure. Stakeholder expectations have insignificant relation with 
environmental disclosure. Internal stakeholder group proved not to influence the 
disclosure of firms' environmental information. Regardless of this insignificance, 
shareholders indeed negatively affect the disclosure of environmental information, 
implies that firms with less concentrated ownership publish environmental disclosure. 
While the considerable gap in the number of employees leads to the contradicting 
prediction. As for external stakeholder group, it is proved not to have a significant 
correlation with environmental disclosure. Despite this fact, government and 
customers are proven to affect environmental disclosure positively significantly. As 
for creditors and suppliers, they show a positive correlation, while competitor shows a 
negative correlation.  It is seemingly true that even though the study has been 
conducted in the European context, results still support the inconsistency in the 
relationship between environmental performance and disclosure. Indirect and direct 
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energy consumption shows a significantly positive effect on environmental disclosure, 
while greenhouse gas emission indicates otherwise. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section is the 
literature review and hypothesis development. The following section addresses the 
sample selection process, measurement, and econometric model. The further section 
discusses the results and analysis. The last section concludes the research, outlines the 
limitations, as well as proposes some suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Stakeholder Theory 
A stakeholder is any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the firm's objectives (Freeman, 1984). A firm, therefore, is likely to 
have many stakeholders, including stockholders, creditors, employees, customers, 
suppliers, public interest groups, government (the State), communities and society. 
The first thing about stakeholder theory is that "it is an explicitly systems-based view 
of the organization (firm) and its environment (stakeholder) which recognizes the 
dynamic and complex nature of the interplay between them" (Gray et al., 1996, pg. 
45). As the stakeholders provide vital resources, give support and contribute to the 
firm, the firm has the responsibility to satisfy stakeholder demands (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
In other words, the more firm tends to be influenced, the higher the dependence on the 
external environment (stakeholder), or the stakeholder is more critical to the 
functioning and survival of the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Thus, assessing the 
importance of satisfying stakeholder demands is a major role of firm management to 
achieve the strategic objectives of the firm to respond to the different expectations of 
stakeholder. 
As the level of stakeholder power increases, a firm must adapt on how to meet the 
increasing demand for the stakeholder. Once stakeholders have successfully gained 
influence over the firm, consequently, the firm has to acknowledge the demands of the 
multiple-stakeholder groups to minimize conflicting interests or to obtain their support 
and approval, or even to distract their opposition and disapproval (Gray et al., 1996). 
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In this way, social and environmental disclosures are seen to be successful tools or 
medium for firms to communicate and negotiate with their stakeholder. 
 
2.2. Legitimacy Theory 
Another theory to explain the practice of environmental disclosure is legitimacy 
theory. Pfeffer (1981) stated that organizations seek legitimacy to ensure commitment 
and support for the organization from its society particularly stakeholders, both 
external and internal (as cited in Tregidga et al., 2006). They ensure the society that 
their business operations or activities are legitimate and fit the social values, norms, 
and bonds. When organizations (firms) demonstrate values that go against social 
values and norms, the legitimacy of such firms is potentially and substantially 
threatened (Brown and Deegan, 1998). This puts a basic premise of legitimacy theory, 
where the existence and binding power of social contract underlie the relationship 
between the organization (firm) and society (stakeholders). Also, legitimacy can 
directly rely on the concept of a social contract. If the firm failed to meet its social 
contract with the society, it would then be perceived as breaching the social contract 
thus the survival of the firm might be threatened. When this condition happens, the 
society will revoke the contract to continue the firm's operation and impose sanctions 
on the firm. Sanctions can be in the form of, for example, consumers reducing the 
demand for the products, factor suppliers eliminating the supply of labor and financial 
capital and constituents lobbying government for increased taxes, fines, or laws to 
prohibit those actions which do not attune to the expectations of the society (Deegan, 
2002).   
Such sanctions will endanger the life continuation of the firm. Thus, a firm will 
seek to establish congruence between the social values associated with or implied by 
their activities and the norms of acceptable behavior in the more extensive social 
system of which they are a part (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). When this congruency is 
not established, there is. Therefore, a legitimacy gap, which arose from an actual 
failure of a firm's performance or firm's actual behavior didn't meet the social values 
and norms. The legitimacy gap will fluctuate or even grow when the firm doesn't 
The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research – September, Vol. 20 , No.3 , 2017. 
344 
 
make any changes to answer the demand to change from the relevant publics' 
expectations. Then it is generally agreed, that if a firm changes its activities, attempts, 
or behavior to alter society's expectations of its activities, these must be accompanied 
by disclosures (Cormier and Gordon, 2001 and O'Donovan, 2002). This way, it can be 
concluded that social and environmental disclosures can be employed to close a 
legitimacy gap (Lindblom, 1994 as cited in Gray et al., 1996). Furthermore, these 
disclosures may then be conceived as a response to the environmental factors where 
they are used to legitimize the firm's activities and behavior. 
 
2.3. Environmental Disclosure in a Stakeholder Context  
Over the past decades, the number of firms who have disclosed their 
environmental information either as part of their annual report or stand-alone 
environmental reports has been increasing. This increasing trend comes along with the 
findings of numerous studies which also suggested that environmental reports of all 
kinds continue to increase over time (Deegan et al., 2002; Elijido-Ten et al., 2010; 
Gray et al., 1995). There are, as noted by Huang and Kung (2010), previous studies 
that have focused on the importance of stakeholder pressure in affecting firms’ actions 
as to their social and environmental disclosures and the degree of these disclosures is 
influenced by the demands of multiple-stakeholder groups.  
Employing Ullmann's model, Roberts (1992), empirically tested the ability of 
stakeholder theory to explain the firm's social responsibility disclosure. Finding 
supported this model concluded a significantly positive correlation between 
stakeholder power, strategic posture and economic performance to the levels of 
corporate social disclosure. Meanwhile, still adopting Ullmann's model is Elijido-Ten 
(2004), whose findings suggest that the main determinants in providing environmental 
disclosures are the level of environmental concern by the top management and the 
government's power to sanction companies. 
Gray et al. (1995) found some evidence that companies were using environmental 
disclosures as an attempt to negotiate the concept of ‘environment' and to determine 
the companies' relationships with society in general and the environmental pressure 
Wulansari and Sholihin 
345 
 
groups in particular. Harvey and Schaefer (2001) used a comparative case study 
approach to examine the relationship of six U.K. water and electrical utilities with 
their green stakeholders. Institutional stakeholders (e.g., government and regulators) 
were found to be the most influential groups although customers and the general 
public were also considered important. 
A more recent study by Elijido-Ten et al. (2010), who conducted an experimental 
study in Malaysia, found that the perceived significance of an environmental event has 
a significant impact on environmental disclosure decisions. Huang and Kung (2010) 
investigated stakeholder expectations associated with a firm's environmental 
disclosure in Taiwan. Their result shows that the level of a firm's environmental 
disclosure is significantly affected by stakeholder groups' demands. 
From all of the findings above and results above, it can be concluded that 
multiple-stakeholder demand, pressure, and power to really influence how firms form 
strategies, react and behave in a way to exhibit their social responsibility actions and 
behavior to meet those demands. One of those actions is conducted through publishing 
and disclosing social and environmental information, where environmental disclosure 
is then seen as a means by which firms communicate and negotiate to their stakeholder 
groups.  Replicating the study by Huang and Kung (2010), this study analyzes how 
firms respond to stakeholder demands thus will shed light on motives that prompt 
firms to provide environmental disclosure, besides at the same time extending it by 
exploring how environmental performance associated with environmental disclosure. 
 
2.4. The Inconsistent Results in the Studies between Environmental 
Performance and Environmental Disclosure 
Few studies in the area of environmental performance provided a brief and 
straightforward definition of the environmental performance; however, it is worth to 
note that defining corporate environmental performance is not a straightforward task 
(Ilinitch et al., 1998). International Standard Organization and European Community 
have successfully expressed the definitions of environmental performance as follows: 
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measurable results of an organization's management of its environmental aspects, 
results can be measured against the organization's environmental policy, 
environmental objectives, environmental targets and other environmental performance 
requirements; and results of an organization's management of its environmental 
aspects (results may be measured against the organization's environmental policy, 
objectives, and targets) (ISO 14031 and EC Regulation No 761/2001 as cited in 
Perotto et al., 2008, pg. 518). 
According to Buhr (1995), a firm chooses a level of environmental performance 
along with a spectrum of possible behaviors and a level of environmental disclosure. 
The selected level of environmental disclosure may have everything or nothing in 
common with the actual environmental performance. The conflicting evidences 
between environmental disclosure and environmental performance have been well-
illuminated in previous studies (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Buhr, 1995; Clarkson et al., 
2008; Dawkins and Fraas, 2011; Deegan and Rankin, 1997; Dragomir, 2010; Hughes, 
2001; Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Mobus, 2005; Patten, 2002; Rockness, 1985; and 
Wiseman, 1982). 
Ingram and Frazier (1980), Wiseman (1982) and Rockness (1985) are those who 
found that no relationship existed between the measured contents of the firms’ 
environmental disclosures and the firms’ environmental performance. However, a 
contrary result presents a significant association between environmental performance 
and environmental disclosure (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Dawkins 
and Fraas, 2011). Clarkson et al., (2008) and Dawkins and Fraas (2011) captured the 
positive association between environmental performance and environmental 
disclosure, implying that superior environmental performers are more anticipated in 
disclosing environmental information. On the contrary, other findings show that it is 
poor performers who make the most disclosures, unveiling the significant negative 
association between environmental performance and disclosure (Dragomir, 2010; 
Hughes et al., 2001; Mobus, 2005; Patten, 2002).  
 
2.5. Hypothesis Development 
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Replicating study by Huang and Kung, stakeholders are classified into three groups: 
1. Internal Stakeholder 
 Huang and Kung classified internal stakeholder groups into shareholders and 
employees. As found by Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993, there is a positive association 
between the number of shareholders and information disclosed in the annual report (as 
cited in Elijido-Ten, 2004). Additionally, the level of ownership concentration 
(blockholder ownership) may also influence the level of disclosure. However, the 
association between them is negative, as portrayed by Christopher and Hassan, 1996; 
Craswell and Taylor, 1992; and Frost, 1999 (as cited in Elijido-Ten, 2004). It suggests 
that the less concentrated or more diffused or dispersed the ownership structure of a 
firm, the higher the likelihood of that firm to disclose information. Meanwhile, block 
holder itself is defined as “the proportion of ordinary shares owned by substantial 
shareholders (shareholding with equity of 5% or more)” (Eng and Mak, 2003, pg. 
326). 
 Employees, other than owners, customers, and suppliers; is distinguished as 
primary stakeholders of a firm since it is one of the primary providers of firm's 
resources (Elijido-Ten, 2007). Firms with a more significant number of employees 
will have a more significant effect on environmental policies and demand for 
transparent environmental information as to prevent the compromising of their rights 
and interests. Furthermore, concluded by Gamerschlag et al. (2011), the number of 
employees does indeed affect the disclosure of social, environmental information. 
Based on the explanation above, a hypothesis is constructed as follows:  
Ha1: Environmental disclosure is associated with internal stakeholders’ expectations 
and demands 
 
2. External Stakeholder 
 As for external stakeholder groups, Huang and Kung classified them into 
government, creditors, consumers, suppliers, and competitors. Among external 
stakeholder groups, the government is said to have the enormous effect on firms. 
Firms who violate environmental regulations and laws will be fined and asked to pay 
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penalties. In this case, large firms are considered to carry more burden and pressure 
from their society towards social and environmental matters. It is in the best interest of 
the firms to avoid government intervention by considering both the regulations and the 
expectations of its stakeholders to preserve its business activities (Elijido-Ten, 2004). 
Creditors, as argued by Roberts (1992), have a more significant influence on corporate 
policies, in this case, environmental policies, when the borrowing firms have high 
financial leverage. The more the firm depends on debt financing, the more likely it is 
to disclose environmental information to be seen as a firm with lower risk (Elijido-
Ten, 2004). While these two findings support a positive association between creditors 
and environmental disclosure, Belkaoui and Karpik (1989); Cormier and Gordon 
(2001); and Cormier and Magnan (1999) obtained a negative association. Different 
from Huang and Kung who predicted only positive association, this study will be open 
for possibilities (+/-) in this association.  
As for suppliers, they will demand more transparent environmental information to 
prevent themselves being linked to bad environmental performance. Meanwhile, for 
customers, Huang and Kung (2010) added that customers' engagement on firms' 
environmental disclosure and its contents is an indication that environmental 
performance is being intended to serve customers. The unavailable data of advertising 
fees drives this study to use sales turnover as a proxy variable for customers. The use 
of sales turnover is supported by Hong et al. (2012), who mentioned that customers' 
power comes from themselves since they provide revenues (sales) for firms. Thus, 
when firms neglect their responsibility to disclose environmental information to 
customers, the survival of these firms might be endangered. 
As for the competitor, the proxy variable used is market share. Firms with a 
higher market share may expose a more significant influence in controlling the market, 
and this will cause firms to attain more attention from their society and other 
competitors. To handle this, firms will then reveal more information on their 
environmental disclosure. Based on the explanation above, a hypothesis is constructed 
as follows: 
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Ha2: Environmental disclosure is associated with external stakeholders’ expectations 
and claims 
 
3. Intermediary Stakeholder 
 Intermediary stakeholder groups are classified into environmental protection 
organizations and accounting firms. According to Deegan and Gordon (1996), firms 
within higher sensitivity industries will increase their levels of environmental 
disclosure under some pressure from an environmental organization. Meanwhile, 
Huang and Kung (2010) also added that the monitoring strength of auditors affects the 
quality of information disclosure. Previous research suggested that the Big 4 
accounting firms (auditors) provide superior quality assurance as compared to non-Big 
four auditors (Teoh and Wong, 1993 and Watkins et al., 2004 as cited in Huang and 
Kung, 2010). However, the samples used in this study were selected from the most 
polluting industrial sectors in Europe, indicating that they are environment-sensitive 
firms. Moreover, after checking at OneSource Global Business Browser financial 
database, all of the sample firms were audited by the Big 4 auditors. These reasons 
lead this study to exclude the testing of intermediary stakeholders and its influence on 
environmental disclosure.   
 Environmental reporting or disclosure as we have discussed above is described by 
FEE as a report covers the preparation and provision of information, by management, 
for the use of multiple stakeholder groups (internal and external), on the 
environmental status and performance of their firms or organizations. Consequently, 
firms' environmental disclosure should have reflected its environmental performance. 
Meanwhile, this ideal definition sometimes doesn't go along with the current real 
practice. Some previous studies noted the inconsistency in the association or 
relationship between environmental performance and environmental disclosure. This 
study, however, tries to shed light in environmental disclosure study and contribute in 
a way as it examines the merely empirical evidence on European environmental 
performance and disclosure studies. The next hypothesis is constructed as follows:  
H1: Environmental disclosure is associated with firms’ environmental performance 
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3.  Research Method 
3.1.  Sample Selection Process 
The population used in this study is firms listed on the FTSEurofirst 300 Index 
from 2007-2011, with the initial sample comprised of 254 firms. The FTSEurofirst 
300 Index, created by FTSE Group and NYSE Euronext, is the definitive benchmark 
of blue-chip pan-European equities. Meanwhile, the designated periods were selected 
based on the establishment of European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register 
(Regulation 2006/166/EC), which give access of environmental information of 
European firms; and Decision 2007/589/EC, the amendment of Decision 
2004/156/EC, which require firms to fulfill a complete, consistent, transparent and 
accurate monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions. From this population, 
the sample is extracted by selecting four most polluting industrial sectors in Europe 
(based on European Pollution Release and Transfer Register: energy, production, and 
processing of metals, mineral/mining and chemical industry), resulting in 42 sample 
firms. These four industrial sectors are chosen regarding sample homogeneity and at 
the same time to break the limitations in Dragomir's findings (2010), as he stated that 
sample heterogeneity was regarded as a significant flaw of the final output. The 
purposive sampling method was utilized to select the sample. We removed from 
consideration ten firms that did not publish an annual report, environmental 
information within the annual report or stand-alone environmental/ sustainability 
report during 2007-2011 and did not have sufficient data in financial database Osiris 
and OneSource Global Business Browser. The final sample comprised of 32 firms for 
five periods (2007-2011).  
 
3.2. Measurement  
The dependent variable in this study is environmental disclosure, measured in the 
annual report or stand-alone sustainability/corporate responsibility report using 
content analysis. Although this study replicates the research by Huang and Kung 
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(2010), an environmental disclosure index developed by Dragomir (2010) is utilized. 
The environmental disclosure index is chosen to fit this study best in that it has been 
used by Dragomir to test the European sample. This index was developed based on the 
3.1 version of GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines which is acknowledged as the 
best practice on the environmental side and the most widely adopted guidelines by 
firms around the world. 
Reporting Guidelines are an incipient scoring system, and the topics in these 
guidelines are capable of being treated at various levels of comprehensiveness, 
ranging from being mentioned briefly to being fully documented quantitatively 
(Morhardt et al., 2002). Thus, this study incorporates these topic guidelines into a 
scoring system and “assign a range of points indicating how thoroughly the topics 
were discussed, also use a five-level ordinal scale to measure the degree of voluntary 
environmental disclosure, ultimately seeking to award quantitative, comparable and 
benchmarked information against vague narratives” (Dragomir, 2010, pg.369) as 
shown in the table below.  
To construct a scoring system from the guidelines, Dragomir identified every 
item regarded as environment performance indicators section of the GRI guidelines – 
resulting in 26 items of disclosure, for a maximum 62 points, as can be seen in table 3. 
 
3.3. Independent Variable: Stakeholder Expectations 
As one of the independent variables, stakeholder expectations, is developed into a 
reliable proxy by Huang and Kung (2010). However, due to the unavailability of data 
regarding advertising fees, this study otherwise uses sales turnover as the proxy 
variable for customers. In support of this idea is Hong et al. (2012), who mentioned 
that customers' power comes from themselves since they provide revenues for firms. 
Furthermore, regarding fines and penalties as the proxy variable of government, it is 
believed that what Huang and Kung refer to fines and penalties are not limited only to 
the amount which has been paid. They clearly stated "…past and present fines and 
penalties; and potential fines and penalties…" (pg.443) and "…fines and penalties and 
the future environmental expenses…" (pg.446). Henceforth, this study uses 
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environmental provision (in which past, present and potential fines and penalties are 
included) for the proxy variable of government. The proxy variables for all of the 
stakeholder groups are shown at the following table.  
 
3.4. Independent Variable: Environmental Performance 
This study follows a recent study by Dragomir (2010) who developed a reliable 
proxy to measure environmental performance quantitatively. Two measures were 
employed after being normalized for firm size. The normalization is required to enable 
comparison between firms of different size (Trucost.com, 2009 as cited in Dawkins 
and Fraas, 2011). The two measures are:  
1. Group-level direct and indirect energy consumption data were collected from 
annual sustainability reports in gigawatt-hours (GWh) and normalized by firm size 
(ECTA). However, some companies reported in tonnes of oil equivalent (toe), in 
megajoules, or in metric tonnes, for which the figures were converted to GWh 
using the tool available on the International Energy Agency's website 
(www.iea.org). There are 147 valid observations in this category.  
2.  Group-level greenhouse gas emissions in kilotons of CO2 equivalent were 
collected from data presented in annual sustainability reports (CO2TA). Decision 
2004/156/EC, as amended by Decision 2007/589/EC, has laid down guidelines for 
firms in Europe to fulfill a complete, consistent, transparent and accurate 
monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions (Dragomir, 2010). As a 
consequence, there are more available data on this category, 155 valid 
observations. This indicator was also normalized by firm size. 
These two measures are left with the predicted sign of +/- caused by the inconsistent 
results in the study between environmental performance and environmental disclosure. 
 
3.5. Control Variables, Firm Size and Inclusion in the Sustainability Index 
Previous studies (e.g., Cowen et al., 1987; Deegan & Gordon; 1996; Gray et al., 
1995; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Patten, 1992 as cited in Patten, 2002) found a 
significant relationship between firm size and the extent of environmental disclosure. 
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This study particularly proxy firm size as total assets, in line with Hackston and Milne, 
1996; and Branco and Rodrigues, 2008 (as cited in Khemir and Baccouche, 2010). 
However, the findings are still debatable in that Dragomir (2010) and Elijido-Ten 
(2004) documented a significant positive association; while Roberts (1992) 
documented negative association. Because the firms come from different countries in 
Europe with different currencies, the amount for total assets will be converted to Euro 
(€) at the appropriate exchange rate for the end of the fiscal year based on OneSource 
Global Business Browser database, to ensure comparability. 
Inclusion in a sustainability index (FTSE4Good Index) is a dummy variable 
which equals one for the group belonging to this index. The FTSE4Good Index series 
is a series of ethical investment stock market indices launched in 2001. It is designed 
to objectively measure the performance of companies that meet globally recognized 
corporate responsibility standards. Due to the small to medium effect between the 
inclusion in sustainability index and environmental disclosure, this control variable is 
signed +/-. 
Econometric Model 
 
 
 
The variables in the regression above are defined as follows: 
ED  = the score of total environmental disclosure obtained by performing a content 
analysis based on GRI-inspired environmental disclosure index (table 3.3). 
OWN  = the blockholder ownership, measured by adding up the shareholding of the 
substantial shareholders (own >5% from the total ordinary shares outstanding). 
EMP = the number of employees. 
FINES = past, present and potential fines and penalties (environmental provision) in 
regard to environmental protection regulations. Net sales deflate the amount of 
environmental fines and penalties. 
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LEV = the degree of financial leverage, measured as the ratio of the earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by EBIT minus interest expense as of fiscal 
year-end. 
SALES = natural logarithm of sales turnover. 
INVT = inventory turnover, measured as the ratio of cost of goods sold and average
 inventory as of fiscal year-end. The amount is scaled by industry-average 
inventory turnover ratio. 
MKTS = market share, measured as net sales divided by the total sales of the 
industry. 
ECTA = total direct and indirect energy consumption in GWh, normalized by a total 
asset.  
CO2TA = greenhouse gas emission (CO2 emission equivalent), normalized by a total 
asset. 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset value in a million Euros (€) measured as of the 
end of the fiscal year 2007-2011. 
FTSE = the inclusion in the sustainability index (FTSE4Good Index), measured using 
a dummy variable (1 = inclusion in the index, 0 = not included in the index). 
β0-12 = coefficient of regression. 
i  = the 32 firms. 
t = 2007-2011. 
      = error term. 
This study utilizes a panel (pooled) design which is considered appropriate to 
break the limitations induced by cross-sectional design as expressed by Dragomir. 
Using Eviews 6.0, fixed effects model (FEM) is chosen as the best model for 
analyzing the data after went through the restricted F-Test and Hausman Test. It is 
worth noting that there are missing data in this study, to mention 25 missing data in 
environmental performance variable (23 missing data in ECTA and five missing data 
in CO2TA). These missing data were replaced by zero replacement and average 
replacement. The fixed effects regression results from these two replacements are the 
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same; except the probability of energy consumption (ECTA) becomes insignificant 
when using average replacement. It may be due to a large number of missing data is 
found in ECTA itself. Henceforth, this study replaced the missing data with 0 (zero) to 
distinguish the firms who do not disclose their energy consumption information.   
 
4. Results  
4.1. Environmental Disclosure Scoring 
This index consists of six categories, a total of 26 items of disclosure, for a 
possible 62 points. However, the maximum score of 42 is attributed to only one firm. 
This result may be due to few findings regarding data measurement techniques and 
bases for calculations which are inadequately described in 
environmental/sustainability reports (score 3). Moreover, the absence of score 4 in any 
of the 160 sample also contributes to the relatively low mean disclosure score of 26.4. 
It can be inferred from this result that the sample firms have environmental disclosure 
comparability for the reporting entity and multiple periods, despite the lack of 
conformity with the guidelines. Meanwhile, the lowest score of ten indicates that a 
minimal level of environmental/sustainability reporting was present across the sample, 
although all firms in the sample report at least rudiments of environmental concern 
(Dragomir, 2010). This score is two times higher than the lowest score of what 
Dragomir found on his study, suggesting a narrower range of the total disclosure 
scores. 
The first category, environmental governance and credibility aspect, focus on 
disclosures about a firm's governance structure and management systems put in place 
concerning environmental protection. The items in this category are the most attained 
ones by firms (68.75-100%). The reason for this finding may be because firms tend to 
elaborate more on their environmental policies and prefer statements rather than 
numbers (see also EN6, EN18, and EN26). On the other hand, under the category of 
material, the percentage of materials used that are recycled input materials is the item 
least attained by firms (15.6-37.5%). The quantity of information provided for EN2 is 
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usually very scarce because recycling is mostly implemented only to waste, in which 
the outcome will not be used as input materials. 
According to Krippendorff (1980), there are two basic criteria to be fulfilled in 
content analysis, reliability and validity. He identified three types of reliability: 
stability, reproducibility, and accuracy. The results of the coding process are stable in 
that the initial coding of environmental information was subject to a later verification 
(Dragomir, 2010). Two coders conducted content analysis in this study. Nonetheless, 
the unavailability of the second coder to content analyze the extension of the sample 
(initial sample was only 96 for 32 firms from 2007-2009) leads to verification of 96 
sample from 2007-2009 only. Another coder did not replace the second coder because 
conflicting coding may arise from cognitive differences between the coders. 
Meanwhile, reproducibility, sometimes called inter-coder reliability, refers to the 
extent to which content classification produces the same results when the same text is 
coded by more than one coder (Dragomir, 2010). As for sample firms' environmental 
disclosure scores from 2007-2009, there were very few differences in the results 
among the two coders, suggesting the presence of reproducibility. While accuracy, 
according to Dragomir, refers to the extent to which the classification of text 
corresponds to a standard or norm. This study exhibits accuracy, in that the coding 
scheme corresponds to the GRI environmental indicators. As for validity, it can be 
seen from the results of this study. 
 
4.2.  Regression Results 
The econometric model suggested above is appropriate to be used in this study. 
This condition applies because R2 > Adj.R2 and proves by 0.811 > 0.743. R-squared 
depicts the amount of variance explained in the dependent variable by the predictors or 
independent variables (Sekaran, 2010). However, it causes a bias towards the number 
of independent variables in the model. Every addition of independent variable into the 
model will cause the increasing of R2, despite the degree of significance towards Y. 
Thus, Adjusted R2 is chosen to explain this variance, instead of R2. The Adj.R2 value 
of 0.743 means that independent variables provide 74.3% required information to 
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predict the variation of the dependent variable. Meanwhile, the rest 26.7% is explained 
by other factors outside the model of this study.  
 
a Coefficient for each variable is shown, with a p-value in parentheses. 
b *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Although stakeholder expectations and environmental performance (controlled by 
size and inclusion in sustainability index) have a simultaneous joint effect toward 
environmental disclosure (F-Stat [11.966] > F-Table [1.549]), the result is different 
when each of the independent variables is analyzed. 
 
4.3.  Internal Stakeholders’ Expectations and Environmental Disclosure 
From table 4 in Appendix, it is concluded that there is no association between 
internal stakeholders (shareholders and employees) and environmental disclosure; 
hence the first hypothesis (Ha1) is rejected (-0.014845, p=0.7199). Even though 
insignificant, the relationship between shareholders and environmental disclosure is 
negative, still in line with the predicted sign. The negative coefficient suggests that the 
more diffused or dispersed the ownership structure of a firm, the more shareholders 
demand for a broader range of information about corporate activities, particularly 
social and environmental activities. Therefore, the likelihood of that firm to disclose 
information is also greater. Not only applies to Taiwan (Asia) context, but this finding 
also applies in the European context, although the statistical result is not significant. 
This insignificantly negative association is consistent with Elijido-Ten’s (2004), Liu 
and Anbumozhi (2009) and Roberts’ (1992) findings. The ownership of most 
European firms is mainly in the hands of individuals and is frequently family 
controlled (Enriques and Volpin, 2007 as cited in Elmans, 2012). It implies that the 
concentration of ownership is high. Thus, the negative relationship is exhibited. 
However, as supported by Elijido-Ten (2004), it’s not the level of ownership 
dispersion that affects the disclosure of environmental information but perhaps more 
the concern for the environment by the majority shareholders. 
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Against the predicted sign, a negative yet insignificant relationship is documented 
between the number of employees and environmental disclosure (-4.68E-05, 
p=0.1652). One explanation of this finding is “executives/managers think employees 
would rather see the firm maintain its viability and longevity rather than contribute to 
the broader society” (Aerts et al., 2006, pg. 181). It is observed during the scoring of 
environmental disclosure that firms with the relatively high disclosure scores are not 
firms with a high number of employees. The highest score (42) is obtained by a firm 
which has 78,313 employees, while the firm which is the second highest in the number 
of employees (315,867) only obtained a total score of 13 (the lowest score is ten 
across the sample). Other than this, a wide gap in the number of employees may 
contribute to the negative statistical result (the lowest-highest number of employees: 
2,345- 331,266 employees). As supported by Wagner (2005), "the short time-period of 
the analysis cannot fully rule out that some longer-term positive effects are not 
accounted for" (pg. 181) hence the negative relationship may be less severe than what 
is found at this study.  
Overall, there are only two out of five stakeholders demonstrate a significant 
association with environmental disclosure. Henceforth, the second (Ha2) hypothesis is 
rejected while the null hypothesis is accepted. Firms obliged to fines and penalties, or 
provide a large amount of environmental provision tend to disclose more positive 
environmental information (147.9582, p=0.0017). The significantly positive 
relationship indicates firms aim to legitimate their negative behavior (of receiving 
fines and penalties) to be perceived as an excellent environmental performer. This 
result is in line with legitimacy theory, in that low performer discloses environmental 
information. Using sample from environmentally sensitive industrial sectors, this 
study portrays the same result as those of prior studies (Elijido-Ten, 2004; Liu and 
Anbumozhi, 2009). The findings present evidence that firms from environmentally 
sensitive industrial sectors provide more environmental disclosures as a way to 
minimize or avoid government sanctions or penalties, thus suggesting a positive 
relationship in between. 
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Huang and Kung (2010) suggested that creditors will demand more information 
be disclosed when a firm faces high financial risks as a mean to keep themselves 
informed as to the latest corporate developments and to make their economic decisions 
accordingly. However, opposite finding suggests that creditors fail to capture the 
significant relationship with environmental disclosure (0.393756, p=0.548). Despite 
the insignificant result, the correlation in between is positive, in line with Elijido-
Ten’s (2004), Huang and Kung’s (2010) and Roberts’ (1992) findings. As further 
explained by Roberts (1992), the creditors’ power depends upon the degree to which a 
firm relies on debt financing. In spite of the highly levered sample used in this study 
which implies that creditors can greatly determine the firm’s business activities, the 
correlation appears to be insignificant. The statistical result in this study is consistent 
with Liu and Anbumozhi’s (2009) finding.  
As for customers, sales turnover can indeed replace the proxy suggested by 
Huang and Kung, advertising fees. A significantly positive relationship between 
customers and environmental disclosure explains that customers, the primary 
stakeholder of a firm who mainly affects its revenue and survival, can substantially 
affect the environmental information disclosed by firms (4.839244, p=0.0274). The 
more significant amount of sales a firm gained from its customers, the higher the 
likelihood of that firm to disclose environmental information. Therefore, this finding 
supports Huang and Kung (2010) in that customer is capable of affecting firms' 
environmental disclosure. 
Suppliers provide firms with vital resources, in return, suppliers will demand to 
see more transparent environmental information to keep themselves updated on the 
latest corporate environmental strategies (Huang and Kung, 2010). Nonetheless, the 
statistical result captured an insignificant association between suppliers and 
environmental disclosure (1.227919, p=0.4546). One reason which may lead to this 
result is the finding by Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) who surveyed with the 
respondents of Australian companies. The finding documented that firms' concerns 
toward supplier ranked as being of least importance by the respondents. Aside from 
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this survey, an insignificant association is well captured in the empirical study 
conducted by Hong et al. (2012).  
As for competitors, an insignificant and negative relationship present between 
competitors and environmental disclosure (-44.90012, p=0.6029). Although no 
significant association is found, the negative result in this study demonstrates that it 
firms even with low market share who disclose environmental information. 
Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) captured a negative association in competitors' response 
to environmental issues. Other than this, no evidence documented similar result. It 
may be due to the little evidence on the relationship between competitor and 
environmental disclosure; and the classification of competitors as one of the secondary 
or adversarial stakeholders which draws little attention from scholars. 
 
4.4. Environmental Performance and Environmental Disclosure 
The conflicting results in the relationship between environmental performance 
and environmental disclosure have led to the testing of these two variables in the 
European context with the expectation to follow either the positive or negative-stream. 
First developed and tested by Dragomir (2010), the two measures of environmental 
performance, energy consumption and CO2 emission released, surprisingly contradict 
each other. Whereas energy consumption normalized by total assets (ECTA) 
demonstrates significantly positive result (1.001929, p=0.0337), CO2 emission 
released normalized by total assets (CO2TA) exhibits negative and insignificant 
finding (-1.20437, p =0.5159). These findings, however, lead to the conclusion that the 
third hypothesis (Ha3) is rejected thus environmental performance has no significant 
relationship with environmental disclosure (in line with Freedman and Jaggi, 1982; 
Ingram and Frazier, 1980; and Wiseman, 1982). This finding may partly be because 
GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines has not been made into a mandatory 
guideline in Europe. Thus, many firms are found not fully reporting their 
environmental performance information. 
However, regardless its insignificance, the contradicting coefficient between the 
two measurements of environmental performance will be discussed. The statistical 
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result of the first measurement, ECTA, indicates that good performer with a low 
energy consumption discloses environmental information. In other words, superior 
environmental performers are more forthcoming in disclosing environmental 
information.  Meanwhile, the negative association of CO2TA explains that it is low 
performers who disclose environmental information. To reduce the risk possessed by 
their stakeholders (for conducting bad environmental performance and showing ‘bad' 
behavior), firms thus attempt to legitimize their behavior by disclosing environmental 
information. 
Both control variables, firm size (total assets) and inclusion in sustainability 
index (FTSE4Good), indicate insignificant results.  Thus, firm size (-1.831862, 
p=0.4841) and inclusion in sustainability index (0.498027, p=0.6949) cannot be used 
as control variable. A similar result was also pointed out by Roberts (1992), in that 
firm size is not supported as a control variable on the level of environmental 
disclosure.  
 
5.   Conclusion, Implication, and Limitation 
After reviewing the statistical facts, we can conclude that neither stakeholder 
expectations nor environmental performance is related to or associated with 
environmental disclosure. Internal stakeholder group does not influence the disclosure 
of firms' environmental information. Regardless of this insignificance, shareholders 
indeed negatively affect the disclosure of environmental information, implies that 
firms with less concentrated ownership publish environmental disclosure. While the 
huge gap in the number of employees’ leads to the contradicting prediction. As for 
external stakeholder group, it is proven that it has no significant correlation with 
environmental disclosure. Despite this fact, government and customers are proven to 
affect environmental disclosure positively significantly. These stakeholders, based on 
Roberts' (1992), are primary stakeholders of a firm. The significant findings suggest 
that legitimacy theory applies in this study in that it is firms with a high amount of 
fees and provision of environmental matters who disclose environmental information. 
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Meanwhile, regarding the continued viability of its business activity, the firm 
discloses environmental information to answer the differing demands of its 
stakeholders. As for creditors and suppliers, they show a positive correlation, while 
competitor shows a negative correlation.  It is seemingly true that even though the 
study has been conducted in the European context, results still demonstrate 
contradicting evidence in the relationship between environmental performance and 
disclosure. ECTA shows a significantly positive result while CO2TA shows 
otherwise. 
The implications of this study are limited by research design in general. More 
specifically, the scope and number of samples were limited to only 32 European firms 
listed on the FTSEurofirst 300 Index. Therefore, the result of this study is limited to 
the European context and cannot be generalized into another setting. Secondly, no 
absolute measurement is found in the environmental performance literature. Therefore, 
it may cause the contradicting results in the studies between environmental 
performance and disclosure. 
Moreover, it is also possible that there are anomalous samples or sample year in 
which most companies are performed well or poorly. Lastly, instead of Huang and 
Kung’s environmental disclosure scoring-index, this study uses Dragomir’s. This 
reason is suspected to cause the different results from Huang and Kung’s. Thus, these 
two studies cannot be compared. 
Future studies might be worth conducted in Indonesia context as little evidence is 
found in the study of stakeholder and environmental disclosure. Additionally, to prove 
and compare the results between Huang and Kung (2010) and the model of this study, 
it is suggested to utilize the environmental disclosure scoring-index developed by 
Huang and Kung.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1:  
The Scoring Scale of Environmental Performance Data 
Score For each indicator in the disclosure index, points are awarded according to the 
scheme below 
0 Performance data, not present (including any non-quantitative references to 
performance) 
1 Performance and/or governance information is presented only for the current period 
2 The report and the information contained within it can be compared on a year-to-year 
basis 
3 The criteria above, plus the data measurement techniques and bases for calculations 
are adequately described and can be replicated with similar results 
4 The criteria above, plus the organization’s performance can be compared with 
appropriate benchmarks 
 
Table 2 
Stakeholder Groups Proxy Variables Predicted Sign 
Internal Stakeholders   
Shareholders Concentrated ownership - 
Employees Number of employees + 
External Stakeholders   
Government Fines and penalties + 
Creditors Financial leverage +/- 
Customers Sales turnover + 
Suppliers Inventory turnover + 
Competitors Market share + 
Proxy Variables for Stakeholders 
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Table 3 
Environmental Disclosure Scoreboard 
G3 link Aspects concerning 
environmental 
inputs and outputs 
Scale  Firms attaining this item (%) Average 
Score 
    2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  
 Environmental 
governance and 
credibility 
Max. 
6 
       
4.9 Existence of 
management 
positions for 
environmental 
protection and 
pollution control 
0-1  32 
(100%) 
32 
(100%) 
32 
(100%) 
32 
(100%) 
32 
(100%) 
1 
4.1 Existence of an 
environmental and/or 
public issues 
committee in the 
board 
0-1  28 
(87.5%) 
30 
(93.7%) 
31 
(97%) 
31 
(97%) 
32 
(100%) 
0.95 
4.8 Existence of terms 
and conditions 
applicable to 
suppliers and/or 
customers regarding 
environmental 
practices 
0-1  32 
(100%) 
31 
(97%) 
32 
(100%) 
32 
(100%) 
31 
(97%) 
0.99 
3.13 Independent 
verification/assurance 
about environmental 
information in annual 
reports 
0-1  25 
(78%) 
26 
(81.2%) 
29 
(91%) 
30 
(94%) 
32 
(100%) 
0.89 
2.1 External 
environmental 
performance awards 
0-1  27 
(84.4%) 
26 
(81.2%) 
26 
(81.2%) 
22 
(69%) 
23 
(72%) 
0.78 
4.13 Memberships in 
industry associations 
and advocacy 
organizations to 
improve 
environmental 
practices 
0-1  29 
(91%) 
27 
(84%) 
27 
(84%) 
27 
(84%) 
29 
(91%) 
0.87 
 Average Score        0.91 
 Subtotal        5.47 
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 Materials Max. 
8 
       
EN1 Materials used by 
weight or volume 
(core) 
0-4  13 
(40.6%) 
20 
(62.5%) 
19 
(59%) 
20 
(62.5%) 
23 
(72%) 
1.04 
EN2 Percentage of 
materials used that 
are recycled input 
materials (core) 
0-4  6 
(18.7%) 
5 
(15.6%) 
8 (25%) 12 
(37.5%) 
9 
 (28%) 
0.35 
 Average Score        0.69 
 Subtotal        1.34 
 Energy Max. 
14 
       
EN3 Direct energy 
consumption by 
primary energy 
source (core) 
0-4  30 
(94%) 
30 
(94%) 
29 
(91%) 
29 
(91%) 
29 
(91%) 
1.71 
EN4 Indirect energy 
consumption by 
primary source (core) 
0-4  26 
(81.2%) 
26 
(81.2%) 
25 
(78%) 
25 
(78%) 
25 
(78%) 
1.41 
EN5 Energy saved due to 
conservation and 
efficiency 
improvements (add) 
0-2  25 
(78%) 
21 
(65.6%) 
23 
(72%) 
21 
(65.6%) 
26 
(81.2%) 
0.87 
EN6 Initiatives to provide 
energy-efficient 
products and services 
(add) 
0-2  31 
(97%) 
29 
(91%) 
28 
(87.5%) 
29 
(91%) 
30 
(94%) 
1.02 
EN7 Initiatives to reduce 
indirect energy 
consumption and 
reductions achieved 
(Add) 
0-2  13 
(40.6%) 
13 
(40.6%) 
15 
(46.9%) 
8  
(25%) 
9  
(28%) 
0.39 
 Average Score        1.08 
 Subtotal        5.41 
 Water Max. 
11 
       
EN8 Total water 
withdrawal by source 
(core) 
0-4  21 
(65.6%) 
24 
(75%) 
25 
(78%) 
28 
(87.5%) 
30 
(93.7%) 
1.52 
EN9 Water sources 
significantly affected 
by withdrawal of 
water (add) 
0-1  12 
(37.5%) 
13 
(40.6%) 
14 
(43.7%) 
17 
(53%) 
16 
(50%) 
0.45 
EN10 Percentage and total 
volume of water 
0-2  10 
(31.2%) 
12 
(37.5%) 
11 
(34.4%) 
12 
(37.5%) 
16 
(50%) 
0.56 
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recycled and reused 
(add) 
EN21 Total water discharge 
by quality and 
destination (core) 
0-4  21 
(65.6%) 
23 
(72%) 
22 
(68.7%) 
24 
(75%) 
27 
(84.4%) 
1.33 
 Average Score        0.96 
 Subtotal        3.86 
 Biodiversity Max. 
4 
       
EN11 Location and size of 
land owned, leased, 
managed in areas of 
high biodiversity 
value outside 
protected areas (core) 
0-2  15 
(46.9%) 
13 
(40.6%) 
13 
(40.6%) 
14 
(43.7%) 
18 
(56.2%) 
0.52 
EN12 Description of 
significant impacts of 
activities, products, 
and services on 
biodiversity in areas 
of high biodiversity 
value (core) 
0-2  22 
(68.7%) 
25 
(78%) 
27 
(84.4%) 
28 
(87.5%) 
27 
(84.4%) 
0.82 
 Average Score        0.67 
 Subtotal        1.34 
 Emissions, 
Effluents, and 
Waste 
Max. 
16 
       
EN16,17 Total direct and 
indirect greenhouse 
gas emissions by 
weight (core) 
0-4  31 
(97%) 
31 
(97%) 
31 
(97%) 
31 
(97%) 
31 
(97%) 
1.96 
EN18 Initiatives to reduce 
greenhouse gas 
emissions and 
reductions achieved 
(add) 
0-2  30 
(93.7%) 
31 
(97%) 
32 
(100%) 
32 
(100%) 
28 
(87.5%) 
1.21 
EN19,20 Emissions of ozone-
depleting substances 
and other significant 
air emissions (core) 
0-4  31 
(97%) 
29 
(90.6%) 
28 
(87.5%) 
25 
(78%) 
29 
(90.6%) 
1.76 
EN22 Total weight of waste 
by type and disposal 
method (core) 
0-4  27 
(84.4%) 
28 
(87.5%) 
27 
(84.4%) 
30 
(93.7%) 
31 
(97%) 
1.71 
EN23 Total number and 
volume of significant 
spills (core) 
0-2  16 
(50%) 
16 
(50%) 
17 
(53%) 
19 
(59.4%) 
20 
(62.5%) 
0.77 
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 Average Score        1.48 
 Subtotal        7.41 
 Products, Services, 
and Transport 
Max. 
3 
       
EN26 Initiatives to mitigate 
environmental 
impacts of products 
and services (core) 
0-2  27 
(84.4%) 
30 
(93.7%) 
31 
(97%) 
32 
(100%) 
31 
(97%) 
0.96 
EN29 Significant 
environmental 
impacts of 
transporting products 
and other goods and 
materials, and 
members of the 
workforce (add) 
0-1  18 
(56.2%) 
18 
(56.2%) 
16 
(50%) 
19 
(59.4%) 
18 
(56.2%) 
0.56 
 Average Score        0.76 
 Subtotal        1.51 
 Total Max. 
62 
       
 Mean        26.4 
 Standard Deviation        5.85 
 
 
Table 4 
Regression Result of Fixed Effects Model (Zero Replacement) 
 
Dependent Variable: ED 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample: 2007 2011 
Included observations: 5 
Cross-sections included: 32 
Total pool (balanced) observations: 160 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient 
      C  -3.606716 (0.8634) 
Shareholders (Blockholder Ownership) - -0.014845 (0.7199) 
Employees (Number of Employees) +  -4.68E-05 (0.1652) 
Government (Fines and Penalties) + 147.9582*** (0.0017) 
Creditors (Financial Leverage) + / - 0.393756 (0.548) 
Customers (LN Sales Turnover) + 4.839244** (0.0274) 
Suppliers (Inventory Turnover) + 1.227919 (0.4546) 
Competitors (Market Share) + -44.90012 (0.6029) 
Environmental Performance1 
(Energy Consumption normalized by size) 
+ / - 
1.001929** (0.0337) 
Environmental Performance2 + / - -1.204375 (0.5159) 
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(Total CO2 Emission normalized by size) 
Size  (LN Total Assets) + / - -1.831862 (0.4841) 
Inclusion in Sustainability Index (FTSE4Good) + / - 0.498027 (0.6949) 
      
R-squared 0.811169 
Adjusted R-squared 0.743384 
S.E. of regression 3.129824 
F-statistic 11.96672 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.479842 
 
 
 
 
